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THE EVOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT:
UNITED STATES v. JONES, THE INFORMATION CLOUD, AND
THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
BER-AN PAN ∗
In George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, the citizens of the dystopian, totalitarian country of Oceania are subjected to a grim reality of
constant government surveillance. 1 There, “Big Brother” and his
thought police maintain power through a system of relentless monitoring and subjugation using tools such as the omnipresent two-way
2
telescreen. As an expression of fear and a weighty warning of pervasive government scrutiny, society in Nineteen Eighty-Four exists as a lit3
erary satire to which few modern cultures can compare. In contrast,
the technology necessary to fulfill Orwell’s nightmare is far closer to
fact than fiction.
Consider the modern smartphone: While its GPS function is an
indispensable addition to countless road trips, this ubiquitous device
harbors many of the same capabilities as Nineteen Eighty-Four’s dreaded
telescreen. Although an everyday user might think he is being simply
directed from one location to another, his buying habits, Internet
searches, and text messages are just a few examples of what a service
Copyright © 2013 by Ber-An Pan.
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1. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1988).
2. Id.; see also James Hayes, The Technology of ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’, GEORGE ORWELL
FESTIVAL, http://georgeorwellfestival.org/?page_id=282 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (exploring the history and theory behind the telescreens described in Orwell’s novel).
3. The exception to this, if any, is North Korea. See Doug Bandow, Systematic Tyranny:
How the Kim Dynasty Holds the North Korean People in Bondage, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2012, 8:58
AM),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/08/29/systematic-tyranny-how-

the-kim-dynasty-holds-the-north-korean-people-in-bondage/ (using a report published by
the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea to examine the way in which the regime
maintains its totalitarian society).
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provider receives in return for that phone’s Internet connection.
Similarly, GPS-enabled devices pre-installed in some cars need not
even be in use to relay detailed travel records that exist as intangible
5
entries inside a vast electronic cloud of information. Consequently, a
body of privacy law dependent on physical boundaries is very much in
danger of becoming as quaint a notion as the public telephone booth.
6
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court of the United States
7
concluded that police violated the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution when they attached a GPS-enabled tracking device
to the defendant’s vehicle and used it to monitor the cars movements
8
for twenty-eight days. In finding that police violated Jones’s right to
privacy, Justice Scalia declared that the government’s physical intrusion onto Jones’s vehicle was a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
9
intrinsic tie to property rights.
Jones highlights two uniquely prescient concerns: (1) the impact
10
of modern information-sharing technology on individual privacy,
and (2) what limits ought to be placed on law enforcement from us11
This
ing such technology unrestricted by physical boundaries.
Comment will argue that the Court conveniently avoided addressing
either of these concerns in Jones by applying the property-based ap12
proach developed in outdated cases. In doing so, the Court not only
exploited the loopholes in Fourth Amendment protection created by
modern technology, but also perpetuated the legal uncertainties that

4. See Privacy in the Age of the Smartphone, PRIVACYRIGHTS.ORG (Dec. 2012),
https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2b-cellprivacy.htm (providing a brief introduction to
multiple types of information that are traded back and forth between users and service
providers to educate consumers about privacy concerns when using smartphones and similar devices).
5. See Chris Woodyard & Jayne O’Donnell, Your Car May be Invading Your Privacy,
USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/
2013/03/24/car-spying-edr-data-privacy/1991751/ (describing the dangers of personal
information being collected from cars, often without the driver’s knowledge).
6. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
9. Id. at 949.
10. See infra Part II.A.1.a.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part I.C.
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frustrate individual citizens and law enforcement agents. Instead,
the Court should have recognized that the capabilities of modern
technology go beyond physical limitations and adapted the Fourth
14
Amendment to address this new intangible reality.
Part I will conduct a particularized analysis of the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing specifically on the evolution of a
strictly property-based approach into the more nebulous “reasonable
expectation of privacy” that has split state and federal courts. Part II
will advance three arguments: first, it will argue that the nature of
modern technology has fundamentally changed the way society operates; second, it will suggest that legislative bodies may be more suited
to address this concern on a broader level; finally, it will contend that
framing the Fourth Amendment as a “right to exclude” better addresses the concerns raised by modern technology. Part III will conclude that while Jones was not decided wrongly, courts must advance
an updated perspective of this constitutional guarantee before the
guarantee declines into irrelevancy.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part begins with a brief introduction to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, with particular attention
paid to the relationship between individual privacy and property
15
rights. Next, it surveys how state and federal courts have applied the
Court’s decisions in factually similar cases and reached inconsistent
16
results. Finally, it discusses the reasoning behind the Court’s deci17
sion in Jones. Due consideration is given to the majority opinion
written by Justice Scalia as well as the concurring opinions of Justices
Alito and Sotomayor.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Reflects a Keen Sensitivity to Privacy
Concerns Not Limited to Physical Intrusions
The full text of the Fourth Amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.C.
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but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
18
persons or things to be seized.
At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, neither the
government nor its agents had access to the type of GPS-enabled de19
vices that are the focus of Jones. Instead, the Fourth Amendment was
written when visual surveillance and physical invasions were the pri20
mary method of gathering private information from individuals.
Early Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects this reality as it restricted
the application of the Fourth Amendment to cases of physical tres21
pass. The later development of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” not explicitly tied to property rights represents the judiciary’s at22
tempt to update the Fourth Amendment to meet modern concerns.
1. The Supreme Court Initially Limited the Protection of the Fourth
Amendment to Physical Trespass Despite Strong Dissent
In Olmstead v. United States, 23 the Court held that inserting wires
into ordinary telephone wires without a trespass of the defendants’
24
real property did not constitute a search or seizure. Even if the
25
Fourth Amendment ought to be “liberally construed,” the Court declared, no literal search or seizure occurred in this case because the
evidence was “secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that on26
ly.” As a result, the majority effectively tied the application of the
Fourth Amendment to cases of physical trespass, suggesting that in

18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2011).
20. See id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses,
papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”).
21. See infra Part I.A.1.
22. See infra Part I.A.2.
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. Id. at 465. The Court also compared telephone wires to public highways to justify
its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment “ cannot be extended and expanded to include
telephone wires reaching to the whole world . . . . The intervening wires are not part of his
house or office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.” Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 464.
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the absence of trespass, no privacy rights are implicated. Yet even at
this early stage, Justice Brandeis argued the Fourth Amendment was
adopted in a simpler time and that “[t]ime works changes, [and]
28
brings into existence new conditions and purposes.” Moreover, he
emphasized that “[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire29
tapping.” Justice Butler dissented on the grounds that the Court
should not limit itself to the “literal or ordinary meanings of the
words [of the Fourth Amendment],” but rather “in the light of the
30
principles upon which it was founded.”
In spite of these objections, the Court adopted a similar stance in
31
Goldman v. United States more than a decade later, finding that no
search or seizure occurred when law enforcement used a detecta32
phone to listen in on conversations through the wall of an adjoining
33
office. Insofar as the petitioners had to reckon with Olmstead, the
Court was not only unwilling to overrule its previous decision but also
rejected the suggested distinction between (a) one who assumes the
risk his communication over telephone wires might be intercepted
and (b) one who does not intend his conversation to pass through
34
walls. While Justices Stone and Frankfurter dissented on the same
35
grounds as they did in Olmstead, Justice Murphy wrote separately and
argued: “[I]t has not been the rule or practice of this Court to permit
the scope and operation of broad principles ordained by the Constitution to be restricted, by a literal reading of its provisions, to those

27. Id. (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things . . . it
must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.”).
28. Id. at 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 474.
30. Id. at 487.
31. 316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1967).
32. A detectaphone was described by the Court as a “device . . . having a receiver so
delicate as, when placed against the partition wall, to pick up sound waves originating in
[the] office, and means for amplifying and hearing them.” Id. at 131.
33. Id. at 135.
34. Id. The Court deemed this distinction “too nice for practical application of the
Constitutional guarantee.” Id. The Court additionally reasoned that the term “intercept”
did not “ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it
leaves the possession of the proposed sender.” Id. at 134.
35. Id. at 136 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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evils and phenomena that were contemporary with its framing.” Instead, Justice Murphy recognized “[t]he conditions of modern life
have greatly expanded the range and character of those activities
which require protection from intrusive action by Government offi37
38
cials” such that “[p]hysical entry may be wholly immaterial.” Emphasizing the need for a warrant to adequately safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights, Justice Murphy concluded that Olmstead’s holding
39
was “wrong.”
Nonetheless, the Court maintained its reluctance to separate the
Fourth Amendment from physical property rights two decades later,
rejecting an offer to reconsider Olmstead and Goldman in Silverman v.
40
United States. There, the petitioners argued that police officers’ at41
tachment of a spike mike to the heating duct of their house effectively transformed it into a gigantic microphone that ran through the
42
entire building. Despite the petitioners supplementing their case
with additional examples “in the light of recent and projected developments in the science of electronics” and the Court’s open admission that “the vaunted marvels of an electronic age” may yet contemplate Fourth Amendment implications, the majority concentrated on
the fact that “the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an
43
unauthorized physical penetration into the premises.” In doing so,
the majority distinguished the eavesdropping in Goldman as not involving any “unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitu-

36. Id. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 139.
39. Id. at 141.
40. 365 U.S. 505 (1961), superseded by statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Street Safety Act (“Wiretap Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2006).
41. At the onset of his opinion, Justice Stewart described the design and the operation
of a spike mike thusly:
The instrument in question was a microphone with a spike about a foot long attached to it, together with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones. The officers inserted the spike under a baseboard in a second-floor room of the vacant
house and into a crevice extending several inches into the party wall, until the
spike hit something solid “that acted as a very good sounding board.”
Id. at 506.
42. Id. at 506–07.
43. Id. at 508–09.
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tionally protected area.” Despite open concern over the capabilities
of new technology, the Court thus repeatedly required physical trespass before triggering Fourth Amendment protection.
2. The Supreme Court Specifically Rejected Olmstead and Goldman
in Favor of a Reasonable Standard of Privacy Unrestricted by a
Requisite Physical Intrusion
45

The Court changed course in Katz v. United States, and Justice
Stewart’s majority opinion and Justice Harlan’s concurrence altered
46
significantly the application of the Fourth Amendment. Katz was
convicted of violating a statute prohibiting the interstate transmission
47
by wire communication of bets or wagers. As a part of their investigation, police officers installed an electronic device into the public
telephone booth used by Katz to listen and to record the words spo48
Reversing the judgment of the appellate
ken into the receiver.
court, the Supreme Court held that the government’s activities violated “the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the
49
telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure.’”
Though it characterized the government’s contention that a telephone booth was not a “constitutionally protected area” as “misleading,” the majority refused to translate the Fourth Amendment into a
50
“general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’” Rather, the Court recognized the Fourth Amendment’s protection extended beyond specific
types of governmental intrusion and may “often have nothing to do
51
with privacy at all.”
44. Id. at 510. The Court also stated that “[i]nherent Fourth Amendment rights are
not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.” Id. at
511. Rather, it defined the Fourth Amendment as one that secures “personal rights” at
which “the very core stands the right of a man retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Id.
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 353. The appellate court had determined that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because there was no “‘physical entrance into the area occupied.’” Id. at
348–49.
50. Id. at 350–51.
51. Id. at 350. Notably, the majority recognized that the agents involved in Katz acted
with restraint in installing the listening device but held that “the inescapable fact is that
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.” Id. at 356.
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Justice Stewart specifically emphasized that protecting places or
what a person might knowingly expose to the public was not the pur52
He argued that the Fourth
pose of the Fourth Amendment.
Amendment assures “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro53
tected.” Indicating that the Court had expanded the application of
the Fourth Amendment well beyond the narrow ambit of trespass to
govern “not only the seizure of tangible items, but . . . [also] the recording of oral statements, overheard without any ‘technical trespass
54
under . . . local property law,’” Justice Stewart also concluded that
“the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by
our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated
55
can no longer be regarded as controlling.” Famously, Justice Stewart
declared that “[t]he fact that the electronic device employed to
achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth
can have no constitutional significance” for “the Fourth Amendment
56
protects people, not places.”
Therefore, in the absence of a warrant, “searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 357.
52. Id. at 351.
53. Id. at 351–52. The government alternatively argued that because the telephone
was transparent, Katz could not reasonably rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 352. In response, the Court not only pointed out that what Katz
sought to exclude was the “uninvited ear” rather than the “intruding eye,” but also advocated for a broader interpretation of the Constitution concerning “vital” tools like the telephone booth. Id. Specifically, “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to come play in private communication.” Id.
54. Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
55. Id. at 353.
56. Id. Using Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969), to define a person as
one “aggrieved by the invasion,” the Court also held that “there is a substantial difference
for constitutional purposes between preventing the incrimination of a defendant and
through the very evidence illegally seized from him and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot claim this predicate for exclusion.” Id. at 174. An owner of the
premises, however, “would be entitled to the suppression of government evidence originating in electronic surveillance violative of his own Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . whether or not he was present or participated in
those conversations.” Id. at 176. Likewise in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the
Court declined to extend standing in Fourth Amendment cases to criminal defendants
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Despite Justice Stewart’s well-reasoned opinion, Justice Harlan’s
concurrence is cited most often for its summary of principles defining
57
a “[c]onstitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”
To Justice Harlan, Fourth Amendment protection carried two prerequisites: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
58
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Thus, according to
Justice Harlan, the government violated Katz’s Fourth Amendment
rights because: (1) he subjectively expected his conversations inside
the telephone would remain private, and (2) society accepts such expectations as objectively reasonable because telephone booths are
“temporarily private place[s] whose momentary occupants’ expecta59
tions of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.” Justice Harlan continued to describe Goldman’s limitations on Fourth
Amendment protections as “bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as
60
physical invasion.”
Justice Black dissented, objecting to the majority’s Fourth
Amendment interpretation and to the suggestion that the Court
ought to assume the role of updating the Amendment to current senwho could neither assert a possessory nor a property interest in the place searched by police officers. Id. at 133. The Court also considered the proposition that “a person can
have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth
Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place” to
be “unremarkable.” Id. at 142.
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 361.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 362. Justice Harlan also declared that “[a]s elsewhere under the Fourth
Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions.” Id. Interestingly, Justice White’s concurrence
pointed out that “today’s decision does not reach national security cases.” Id. at 363
(White, J., concurring). Even further, he argued that a broad exception to the warrant
process should be granted to “the President of the United States or his chief legal officer,
the Attorney General,” provided that a magistrate or a judge “has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.” Id. at
364. This open issue would return in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972), in which the majority held that prior judicial approval was required for the types of
domestic security surveillance contemplated under the Wiretap Act. Id. at 323–24. In that
case, Justice White concurred on the statutory ground alone and did not reach the constitutional issue discussed by the majority. Id. at 336 (White, J., concurring).
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sibilities. Regarding the former objection, Justice Black took a strict
approach in construing the language of the Fourth Amendment and
concluded that the text did not apply to what he characterized as
“eavesdropping” because “the language of the second clause indicates
that the Amendment refers not only to something tangible so it can
be seized but to something already in existence so it can be de62
scribed.” Despite accepting the premise that “[t]apping telephone
wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted,” Justice Black argued that the Framers
were aware of eavesdropping as an “ancient practice which at com63
mon law was condemned as a nuisance” and would have restricted
64
law enforcement’s use of eavesdropping had they desired to do so.
In explaining his second objection, Justice Black advocated against
“distort[ing] the words of the Amendment to ‘keep the Constitution
65
up to date’ or ‘to bring it into harmony with the times.’” Such power, he suggested, would inappropriately transform the Court into a
66
“continuously functioning constitutional convention.”
B. The Decisions Following Katz Demonstrate a Struggle to Consistently
Apply the Fourth Amendment to Modern Situations
Without overturning the analysis applied in Katz, Smith v. Mary67
land sparked a series of challenges to its modern applicability, which
culminated in Jones. These challenges highlighted the divide between
68
the now quaint “spike mike” and “detectaphone” operations and
their modern replacements: inexpensive GPS-enabled tracking devices as small as an iPod, many of which already pre-installed in everyday

61. Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 365.
63. Id. at 366 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. Justice Black went as far as to express a professional disappointment in his
peers, declaring: “[I]t strikes me as a charge against their scholarship, their common sense
and their candor to give to the Fourth Amendment’s language the eavesdropping meaning the Courts imputes to it today.” Id.
65. Id. at 373.
66. Id.
67. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
68. See supra Part I.A.1.
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69

phones and vehicles. While the Court has been relatively conservative in applying Justice Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test in context-specific circumstances, state and federal courts have
70
been divided.
1. The Court Has Struggled to Balance Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy with Modern Information-Gathering Technology
In Smith, the Court held that obtaining information derived from
71
a pen register was not a Fourth Amendment search. Using the twostep test described by Justice Harlan in Katz, the majority rejected the
defendant’s claims that he had a legitimate, subjective expectation of
privacy regarding the telephone numbers dialed from his home because telephone companies routinely made permanent records of all
numbers dialed and Smith voluntarily conveyed this information to
72
his particular provider. Moreover, the Court declared that “the site
73
of the call is immaterial” because Smith’s expectation that his conduct would remain private was not one “‘that society is prepared to
74
recognize as reasonable.’”
Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that, although a list of
numbers dialed may not be incriminating in itself, “it easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus re75
veal the most intimate details of a person’s life.” Justice Marshall’s
dissent added that “the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures assigns to the judiciary some prescriptive re76
sponsibility.” According to Justice Marshall, law enforcement offi-

69. See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309,
1310 (2012) (“Millions now own sophisticated tracking devices (smartphones) studded
with sensors and always connected to the Internet.”).
70. See infra Part I.B.2.
71. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. The pen register recorded numbers dialed from the
defendant’s home. Id. at 737. The police were investigating the defendant for a robbery
after which the victim reported receiving “threatening and obscene” phone calls from a
man who claimed to be the robber. Id.
72. Id. at 742.
73. Id. at 743.
74. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
75. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cials should almost always be required to obtain a warrant before re77
questing information from telephone companies.
78
Only a few years later in United States v. Knotts, the Court held
that the government’s warrantless monitoring of a GPS-enabled beeper surreptitiously placed in a can of chemicals sold to the defendant
79
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The government argued
that the beeper was merely a supplement to officers’ visual surveillance of the defendant, which included following his truck from the
80
initial purchase of the can to his cabin. Recognizing that officers
combined both methods of surveillance, the Court added that “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
81
another.” Famously, the reasoning given was that “[n]othing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
82
science and technology afforded them in this case.”
83
In contrast, the Court in United States v. Karo found that the
monitoring of a beeper installed into a can of ether sold to the defendant implicated the protection of the Fourth Amendment because
it “reveal[ed] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the
Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not
84
have otherwise obtained without a warrant.” In spite of the govern77. Id. at 752. Justice Brennan joined both dissents. Id. at 746, 748.
78. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
79. Id. at 285.
80. Id. at 282.
81. Id. at 281. The Court also noted that “[w]e have commented more than once on
the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile.” Id. Thus, because the defendant traveled on public and private roads, the Court declared that “no such expectation of
privacy extended to the visual observation of [the defendant]’s automobile arriving on his
premises after leaving a public highway.” Id. at 282. Further, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy, including “whatever stops he made.” Id. Surprisingly, Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, noting that, had the defendant challenged “not
merely certain aspects of the monitoring of the beeper installed in the chloroform container . . . but also its original installation,” their opinions might have been the opposite.
Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 282 (majority opinion).
83. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
84. Id. at 715. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred
only insofar as the “agents thereafter learned who had the container and where it was only
through use of the beeper.” Id. at 733 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ment’s objections that a broad warrant requirement would raise the
difficulty of conducting any search, the Court offered no sympathy in
concluding that it was entirely possible to describe the circumstances
and length of time in which a beeper might be installed into a partic85
ular object. Furthermore, the Court stated that the primary reason
behind the warrant procedure was to “interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between the citizen and ‘the officer engaged in the
86
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”
2. The Rapid Integration of New Information-Sharing Technology
into Everyday Activity Has Enabled Contrasting Interpretations of
Context-Sensitive Precedent
The Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of the Fourth
Amendment is reflected in a split among the lower courts. On the
one hand, some federal courts have declared that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists when an individual travels on public streets
87
and thus no warrant is required to monitor those movements. On
the other hand, some state courts have stressed that the superior capabilities of modern surveillance technology implicates the Fourth
85. Id. at 718 (majority opinion). Karo also offered the Court an opportunity to address the concerns voiced by Justices Brennan and Marshall in Knotts, namely, whether the
installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the original owner’s consent constituted a search or seizure when the container is delivered to the buyer without
knowledge of said beeper. Id. at 711. To resolve the legality of the warrantless installation,
the Court quickly declared that “[i]t is clear that the actual placement of the beeper into
the can violated no one’s Fourth Amendment rights. . . . [B]y no stretch of the imagination could it be said that respondents then had any legitimate expectation of privacy in it.”
Id. The majority went on to note that the transfer of the can containing the beeper “infringed no privacy interest,” for it “conveyed no information at all.” Id. at 712. Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence opinion went even further and would have construed the privacy
interests implicated by the activation of the beeper as “unusually narrow,” because “one
who lacks ownership of the container itself or the power to move the container at will, can
have no reasonable expectation that the movements of the container will not be tracked.”
Id. at 722 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Instead, Justice O’Connor would “use as the touchstone the defendant’s interest in which the beeper is placed.” Id. at 724. Yet even in spite
of traditional Fourth Amendment protection of the home, “[a] privacy interest in a home
itself need not be coextensive with a privacy interest in the contents or movements of everything situated inside the home.” Id. at 725.
86. Id. at 717 (majority opinion) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948)).
87. See infra Part I.B.2.a.
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88

Amendment. The result of this inconsistency is an incomplete and,
89
at times, contradictory Fourth Amendment doctrine.
a. Prior to Jones, Circuits Recognized That No Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy Exists Along Public Streets and No
Warrant Is Required to Monitor Movements Thereupon
90
In United States v. Garcia, the defendant was convicted of crimes
91
The district
relating to the manufacture of methamphetamines.
court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a GPSenabled tracking device the police had attached to the defendant’s
92
car without a warrant. Writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner held that no search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurred and thus no warrant was
93
required. Judge Posner emphasized the similarities between older
surveillance technology with the device officers used, concluding that:
“GPS tracking is on the same side of the divide with the surveillance
cameras and the satellite imaging, and if what they do is not searching
94
in Fourth Amendment terms, neither is GPS tracking.” Despite acknowledging Katz’s insistence that the Fourth Amendment ought to
95
“keep pace with the march of science” and that “[t]echnological
progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveil96
lance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive,”
Judge Posner nonetheless concluded “the amendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the twen97
ty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.” If anything, Judge

88. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
89. See infra Part II.A.
90. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
91. Id. at 995.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 996–97 (“But of course the presumption in favor of requiring a warrant, or
for that matter the overarching requirement of reasonableness, does not come into play
unless there is a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). Judge
Posner did recognize, however, that United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), left open
“the question whether installing [the beeper] in the vehicle converted the subsequent
tracking into a search.” Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996–97.
94. Id. at 997.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 998.
97. Id.
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Posner acknowledged that the balance between individual security
98
and effective security often falls in favor of the former.
99
In United States v. Marquez, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit took a similar approach in holding that the installation and use of a GPS-enabled tracking device to monitor the de100
fendant’s vehicle did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.
Agreeing with Knotts, the Third Circuit explained that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy when a person travels in an automobile
101
Moreover, the court concluded that so long as
via public streets.
police have reasonable suspicion that a particular vehicle is being
used in pursuit of a crime such as the transport of drugs, “a warrant is
not required when . . . they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device
102
Thus, because here there
on it for a reasonable period of time.”
was “nothing random or arbitrary about the installation and use of
the device,” and the installation itself was “non-invasive and occurred
when the vehicle was parked in public,” Judge Wollman held that no
103
search occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

98. Id.
99. 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010).
100. Id. at 607. The court also found that the defendant lacked standing to contest the
search of a place to which he had “an insufficiently close connection” because he neither
“owned nor drove the Ford and was only an occasional passenger therein.” Id. at 609.
101. Id. The court did acknowledge, however, that “[w]hen . . . police use electronic
monitoring in a private residence, not open to visual surveillance, it violates reasonable
expectations of privacy and is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 609–
10.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court specifically acknowledged Judge Posner’s opinion in Garcia, warning
that although the ability to monitor and to install GPS devices was increasing, the device
here “merely allowed the police to reduce the cost of lawful surveillance.” Id.; see Garcia,
474 F.3d at 998 (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of
surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive.”); see also United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to the undercarriage of his vehicle when
parked on a street or parking lot, and thus the government’s installation and use of a mobile tracking device did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search), vacated, PinedaMoreno v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).
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b. State Courts Have Emphasized the Capacity of Modern
Technology to Go Beyond the Physical Senses and Collect an
Unreasonable Amount of Information
Compare the stance taken by federal appellate courts with the
opposite approach adopted by the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington and the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The
104
Washington supreme court, in State v. Jackson, concluded that the
installation of GPS-enabled devices onto the defendant’s vehicles con105
Although the
stituted a search or a seizure requiring a warrant.
court found that probable cause existed and that law enforcement
106
agents properly obtained a warrant for the GPS tracking, it explicitly
refrained from concluding in all cases that the “use of the GPS devices
to monitor [the defendant]’s travels merely equates to following him
on public roads where he has voluntarily exposed himself to public
107
view.”
108
Likewise, in People v. Weaver, the New York supreme court held
that the placement of a GPS-enabled device onto the defendant’s vehicle and the subsequent monitoring of his movement constituted a
109
search requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. Accepting that individuals have a significantly reduced expectation of privacy
110
along public roads, the court declared that the GPS-enabled device
used was not a mere enhancement of an officer’s senses, but rather “a
surrogate technological deployment” capable of “[c]onstant, relent111
less tracking.” Reasoning that these devices “facilitate[] a new tech112
nological perception of the world,” the court concluded that without judicial oversight, prolonged use of GPS-enabled tracking devices

104. 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
105. Id. at 224.
106. Id. at 231.
107. Id. at 223.
108. 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
109. Id. at 1203.
110. Id. at 1198. The court did concede that “[i]t is, of course, true that the expectation of privacy has been deemed diminished in a car upon a public thoroughfare.” Id. at
1200.
111. Id. at 1199; see also Renee Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search, 38 SEARCH & SEIZURE
L. REP. 21, 26 (2011) (suggesting a new test that differentiates between “senseaugmenting” or “extrasensory” devices).
112. Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d at 1199.
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constituted a massive invasion of privacy “inconsistent with even the
113
slightest reasonable expectation of privacy.”
C. In Jones, the Supreme Court Relied on Property Rights to Apply
Fourth Amendment Protection and Left Unresolved Its Relevance to
Modern Technology
In 2004, the FBI and the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department launched a joint operation to investigate Antoine
Jones and his associates for allegedly supplying significant amounts of
cocaine and cocaine base to residents of the District, the State of Mar114
yland, and elsewhere. In addition to direct visual surveillance and
the use of cellphone wiretaps, agents obtained a warrant in 2005 authorizing the installation of a GPS-enabled tracking device onto the
Jeep Grand Cherokee Jones used subject to two requirements: (1)
that the device be installed within ten days and (2) inside the bound115
Agents installed the device onto
aries of the District of Columbia.
the undercarriage of Jones’s Jeep in Maryland on the eleventh day
and then proceeded to use the device to track the whole of Jones’s
116
The task force ceased
movements over the next twenty-eight days.
covert operations in October when agents seized drugs, firearms, and
cash from a stash house and the homes of a number of Jones’s co117
Jones and eight other defendants were charged with
conspirators.
118
multiple narcotics-related violations the following day.

113. Id. at 1201–03. The dissenting opinion written by Judge Smith argued that “[t]he
proposition that some devices are too modern and sophisticated to be used freely in police
investigation is not a defensible rule of constitutional law.” Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting). The other dissenting opinion authored by Judge Read opined that “[t]he GPS monitoring technology used in this case was less intrusive or informative than physical surveillance of the defendant would have been.” Id. at 1210 (Read, J., dissenting).
114. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73–74 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011).
115. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
116. Id. Law enforcement agents stepped in once during this period to replace the device’s battery while the vehicle was parked at a public parking lot in Maryland. Id.
117. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
118. Id. at 73. Specifically, Jones and his associates were charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846
with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base. Id. They were also charged with
individual violations, including use of a communication facility to facilitate a drug traffick-
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Prior to trial, Jones filed a motion contending that the agents
originally lacked probable cause to attach the GPS-enabled device to
his vehicle and that the installation occurred outside the bounds of
119
Although the government conceded that it
the original warrant.
120
committed technical violations of the warrant, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia agreed that the placement
of the GPS device remained proper because Jones lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy when traveling in public and admitted the information gathered from the device while the Jeep was on public
121
roads. The jury ultimately failed to reach a verdict on the conspiracy
122
count and acquitted Jones and his co-defendants on all others. But,
the government filed another indictment in March 2007 in which the
jury found Jones and a co-conspirator guilty, and both were sentenced
123
to life imprisonment in a joint trial that concluded in January 2008.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit distinguished the facts from Knotts on the basis of
the level of detail with which the GPS-enabled device recorded Jones’s
124
Concluding that the transmission of information
extended habits.
gathered over such a prolonged period was neither harmless nor rea125
sonable, the court reversed Jones’s conviction because the evidence
admitted against him “reveal[ed] types of information not revealed by
126
short-term surveillance” and thus violated his Fourth Amendment

ing offense. Id. Jones was additionally charged with two counts of unlawful possession
with intent to distribute cocaine or cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Count Two), and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count Three),
respectively. Id.
119. Id. at 87–88.
120. Id. at 88. The court suppressed all evidence gathered from the GPS-enabled tracking device while the vehicle was parked in Jones’s personal garage. Id. at 89.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 558.
125. Id. at 567–68.
126. Id. at 562. On the same grounds, the court also rejected the government’s assertion that Jones actually exposed his movements to the public and thus constructively revealed the whole of his movements, analogizing the facts to cases where the Government
has sought to use exactly the same theory in reverse. See id. at 562 (“As with the ‘mosaic
theory’ often invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information,
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127

rights.
The D.C. Circuit denied the government’s petition for re128
hearing en banc.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the government’s installation and tracking of a GPS-enabled device on Jones’s vehicle outside the bounds of a judicially-authorized warrant constituted an un129
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that the phrase “in their persons,
130
house, papers, and effects,” reflected the Amendment’s historically
131
Despite conceding that the Court
“close connection to property.”
had deviated from this approach with the introduction of a “reasona132
ble expectation of privacy,” Justice Scalia emphasized that the Katz
test constituted an addition, not a substitution, to the common-law
133
trespassory rule. Contending that the Fourth Amendment at a minimum must protect those rights afforded to individuals, Justice Scalia
concluded that “‘when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth
134
Amendment’” because “such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
135
when it was adopted.”
‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a
broad view of the scene.’”); see also infra Part II.A.1.b.
127. Id. at 568.
128. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 767 (D.D.C. 2006). Four judges dissented to
the Government’s petition. Id.
129. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2011).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
131. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
132. Id. at 950.
133. Id. at 952.
134. Id. at 951 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286
(1986)).
135. Id. at 949. The Court also stressed that its post-Katz rejection of Fourth Amendment challenges to electronic monitoring using beeper devices such as those featured in
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 148 U.S. 705 (1984),
did not foreclose its conclusion here. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52. Justice Scalia pointed out
that the GPS-enabled device used to track Jones was trespassorily installed while the Jeep
was in his possession, unlike the circumstances in Knotts and Karo where agents attached
similar devices to items not yet in the defendants’ possession. Id. Furthermore, in response to the government’s argument that the mere visual examination of a car in the
public eye could not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court high-
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Justice Alito concurred with the majority’s judgment not because
he agreed that the physical attachment of the GPS-enabled device
constituted a search or seizure, but instead because “the lengthy monitoring” violated the reasonable expectation to privacy afforded to
136
Criticizing the Court’s focus as “unwise” and
Jones under Katz.
“highly artificial,” Justice Alito reasoned that the degree of privacy
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was first adopted was an
inappropriate analogy reminiscent of the trespass rule previously
137
Instead, Justice Alito argued that prolonged
abandoned in Katz.
surveillance conducted purely through indirect, electronic means
138
Applying Katz’s “exwould lead to “particularly vexing problems.”

lighted the admission of the Government agents involved that “‘the officers in this case did
more than conduct a visual inspection of respondent’s vehicle.’” Id. at 952 (emphasis
omitted).

Similarly, the government’s contention that an electronic information-

gathering intrusion in a literal open field did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search
failed to persuade the Court because open fields are not afforded the same level of protection afforded to a private home. Id. at 953. Justice Scalia also added that the Court had
no occasion to consider whether the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause
to attach the GPS device in the absence of a valid warrant because the government did not
raise the issue in the lower courts. Id. at 954.
136. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito argued that “‘an actual trespass is
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’” Id. at 960 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)). Justice Alito also
described the GPS-enabled device used in Jones to be “trivial,” and that restricting Fourth
Amendment protection to instances in which such an item is physically attached to another’s property created the danger of “incongruous results.” Id. at 961; see also United States
v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (2010) (finding that the defendant lacked standing to make
a Fourth Amendment challenge to the installation and use of a GPS-enabled device to the
bumper of a vehicle in which he was merely an occasional passenger). Justice Alito expressed additional concern that the majority’s trespass-based rule would completely ignore
prolonged monitoring using closed-circuit television video monitoring, automatic toll collection systems, cellphones, and other “social” phone-location-tracking services. Jones, 132
S. Ct. at 963.
137. Id. at 958.
138. Id. at 962. Specifically, Justice Alito criticized Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the protection of property originally afforded by the Fourth Amendment to be a misguided application of “18th-century tort law.” Id. at 957. Justice Alito noted, for example: “[S]uppose
that the officers in the present case had followed respondent by surreptitiously activating a
stolen vehicle detection system that came with the car when it was purchased. Would the
sending of a radio signal to activate this system constitute a trespass to chattels?” Id. at 962.
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pectation-of-privacy test” would not only avoid these problems, he
explained, but would more appropriately reflect the practical reality
of modern surveillance technology that regularly utilizes small, easy140
Conseto-use, and relatively cheap devices to monitor persons.
quently, Justice Alito concluded that the appropriate approach to a
Fourth Amendment inquiry was to ask “whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasona141
ble person would not have anticipated.”
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice
Scalia insofar as “Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespasso142
ry test that preceded it.” Consequently, “the trespassory test applied
in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum . . . . The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide this
143
Nonetheless, Justice Sotomayor also echoed Justice Alito’s
case.”
warning that technological advances may render physical trespass irrelevant because “GPS monitoring . . . may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
144
society.’” Specifically, an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy may not be appropriate for a society where “people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
145
Moreover, Justice Sotomayor raised
carrying out mundane tasks.”
doubts regarding the fundamental trigger of the Fourth Amendment,
adding that such people “can attain constitutionally protected status

139. Id. at 962. Justice Alito conceded that his recommendation would present its own
issues. Id. On the one hand, “judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy
with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.” Id. On the
other hand, “the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person
has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.” Id.
140. Id. at 964. Justice Alito did acknowledge, however, that the privacy consequences
of “dramatic technological change” might be better resolved through legislatures more
suited to “balanc[ing] privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir.
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring) (holding that the placement of a GPS tracking unit on the
defendant’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment), vacated, Cuevas-Perez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012)).
145. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy
146
as a prerequisite for privacy.”
II. ANALYSIS
Although the majority in Jones ultimately found that the government’s installation and use of a GPS-enabled tracking device constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, it did so on the basis of
147
In contrast, Justice Alito’s conits “close connection to property.”
currence reckoned with the numerous uncertainties in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence raised by modern technology unburdened
by physical limitations by advancing a standard based upon a “reason148
able expectation of privacy.” Yet neither Justice Scalia’s nor Justice
Alito’s opinions properly recognize how the capabilities of modern
technology have fundamentally changed how people share infor149
In fact, legislative bodies acting in concert with the acamation.
demic and business worlds may be better equipped to solve this
quagmire than a piecemeal solution gradually created by the judiciary. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
150
1968 (“Wiretap Act”) and the Electronic Communications Privacy
151
Act (“ECPA”) provide two examples in which a similar collaboration
has implemented useful, if imperfect, protections of individual priva152
cy rights.

146. Id.
147. Id. at 949 (majority opinion).
148. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis” (emphasis omitted)). It also seems as if Justices Scalia, Alito, and Sotomayor believe that the Fourth Amendment is due a re-evaluation. While Justice Alito supported the
already established test set by Katz, Justices Scalia and Sotomayor seemed to regard Jones as
simply the inappropriate arena in which to re-examine what privacy rights the Constitution
guarantees. Justice Sotomayor even suggested as much, agreeing with Justice Alito’s concern that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance,” but also
siding with Justice Scalia insofar as “the trespassory test applied in the majority’s opinion . . . suffices to decide this case.” Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
149. See supra Part I.C.
150. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2006)).
151. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2006)).
152. See infra Part II.B.
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Until such a broad collaborative solution can be reached, courts
must first act on their own to uniformly recognize that electronic
tracking and other electronic information-gathering processes consti153
Moreover, courts
tute searches under the Fourth Amendment.
ought to take the additional step of recognizing the Fourth Amendment as guaranteeing a person’s “right to exclude” the government to
154
better address uniquely modern concerns. In an era where tangible
155
property is becoming increasingly irrelevant, understanding this
constitutional right as a positive one restores it to its original guarantee: “the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef156
fects.” Jones should thus be read as an example of outdated Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that, in the absence of legislative revision,
ought to spur courts to adopt an appropriately modern picture of its
157
constitutional guarantee.
A. Current Supreme Court Jurisprudence Is Inappropriate and Ill-Suited
to Electronic Tracking
Despite offering several different interpretations of the Fourth
158
Amendment, the Supreme Court has yet to address how it might be
violated through intrinsically intangible, electronic means. Additionally, just as the individual citizen deserves some measure of privacy in
the face of technology that has significantly altered the way in which
159
they communicate with one another, so too must law enforcement
agencies have access to superior technological tools and bright-line

153. See infra Part.II.C.1.
154. See infra Part II.C.2.
155. See infra Part II.A.1.a. Also consider the increasingly common use of laptops and
tablets in the public classroom. See, e.g., James M. Crotty, The Tech-Driven Classroom Is Here,
but Grades Are Mixed, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmarshall
crotty/2012/08/21/the-tech-driven-classroom-is-here-but-grades-are-mixed/

(describing

how education technology already ubiquitous in many classrooms will soon be able to personalize learning to each individual student); Bryan Goodwin, One-to-One Laptop Programs
Are No Silver Bullet, 68 TEACHING SCREENAGERS 78, 78–79 (2011), available at
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational_leadership/feb11/vol68/num05/One-toOne_Laptop_Programs_Are_No_Silver_Bullet.aspx (assessing the objective success of the
widespread initiative to adopt one-to-one laptop programs in public classrooms).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
157. See infra Part III.
158. See supra Part I.A.
159. See infra Part II.A.1.
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160

rules that appropriately limit their reach.
The current inability of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to satisfactorily address either con161
cern demonstrates the need for a different approach.
1. Neither the Factually Limited Property Approach nor the Reliance
on a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Can Keep Pace with
Modern Technology
First, it is important to recognize that the property-based approach offered by Justice Scalia in Jones does not represent a complete
162
While
disregard of the changing nature of electronic information.
the majority rested its holding on a traditional interpretation of
Fourth Amendment protections, it specifically emphasized that “we
163
The concurring opinions
do not make trespass the exclusive test.”
by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito strongly suggest that the Court
is aware that physical invasions are not prerequisites to violations of
164
the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has previously recog165
Secondly, a number of Justices also appear to supnized as much.
port a re-interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to satisfy modern
166
needs. Nonetheless, any proposed solution must first recognize that
the modern age has revolutionized the trappings of individual privacy
and then assess what degree of access police should have to the wealth
167
of private information made available by current technology.

160. See infra Part II.A.2.
161. See infra Part II.C.2.
162. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2011) (majority opinion) (“Situations
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis” (emphasis omitted)).
163. Id.
164. See supra Part I.C.
165. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“We think that obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,’ constitutes a search” (citations omitted)).
166. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
167. See infra Part II.A.2.

2013]

THE EVOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT

1021

a. The Reach and Intersection of Modern Technology Has
Fundamentally Transformed the Frame Through Which Society
Considers Individual Privacy
168

As Jones and its contemporaries indicate, tracking people’s
movements using electronic methods has become an increasingly at169
tractive option in part due to the low cost and ease with which the
170
Where law enforcement agents previously
process is completed.
had to expend substantial time, effort, and resources to monitor a
171
person’s movements over an extended period of time, the success of
the StarChase Pursuit Management system means that external
launchers mounted onto patrol cars capable of affixing GPS-equipped
darts to any vehicle may very well become the new norm rather than a
172
science fiction experiment.
The reality of modern society reflects a near constant connection
to some form of information-sharing technology whether the purpose
is accessing the Internet, replacing a bag of books with a single tablet,
173
Thus it is
or simply plugging in to any number of social websites.
even easier to initiate the information-gathering process because
many of the devices that enable these options carry built-in electronic
168. See supra Part I.B.2.
169. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory—or owner—installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”).
170. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“These ‘fantastic
advances’ continue, and are giving the police access to surveillance techniques that are
ever cheaper and ever more effective. . . . Technological progress poses a threat to privacy
by enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively
expensive.”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“GPS is a vastly different and exponentially more sophisticated and powerful technology that is easily and
cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and remarkably precise tracking capability. . . . Constant, relentless tracking of anything is now not merely possible but entirely
practicable, indeed much more practicable than the surveillance conducted in Knotts.”).
171. Paul D. Schultz, The Future Is Here: Technology in Police Departments, 75 POLICE CHIEF
MAG. (June 2008), available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?
article_id=1527&fuseaction=display&issue_id=62008 (describing a list of ways in which
technology has made police investigative work less time-consuming and more effective).
172. See Elaine Pittman, Real-Life Police Technology Catches up with Science Fiction,
STARCHASE (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.starchase.com/real-life-police-technology-catchesup-with-science-fiction.html.
173. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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GPS trackers that can be activated at a moment’s notice or, more of174
ten, are left on by default. The sheer number of smartphones, tablets, and computers owned by the modern citizen further inflates the
vulnerabilities of a system that continuously transmits potentially pri175
Given this vast and intangible informationvate information.
sharing model, a doctrine purporting to protect individual privacy
rights cannot rest on outdated notions of physical property lest it lack
176
relevance and practicality.
Despite Justice Alito’s criticism that the majority adopted this exact approach in resting its decision on the physical trespass committed by the law enforcement agents in Jones, his own reliance on Justice
Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” raises many of the same
177
Particularly in light of ubiquitous gadgets capable of far
concerns.
more than just location services, an individual’s “expectation of priva178
cy” regarding phone calls and text messages may be even more im179
portant than the privacy of his physical location. Moreover, an individual assertion of privacy leaves unsettled the second prong of the
174. Id.
175. See supra note 4.
176. See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age 2
(Vanderbilt Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10-64, 2011) (“[T]oday, with
the introduction of devices that can see through walls and clothes, monitor public thoroughfares twenty-four hours a day, and access millions of records in seconds, police are
relying much more heavily on what might be called ‘virtual searches,’ investigative techniques that do not require physical access to premises, people, papers or effects . . . . To
date, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has both failed to anticipate this revolution and continued to ignore it.”).
177. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that law enforcement’s
use of devices enabling them to listen in on conversations made through a public telephone booth to violate the Fourth Amendment), superseded by statute, Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2006).
178. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
179. See Renee M. Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment,
55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 411 (2007) (“Though the necessities of modern life may at times
require the disclosure of discrete portions of our daily routine to the handful of private
parties that provide us with services, it is unlikely most Americans would sanction pervasive
monitoring by our government.”); Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket, DAILY BEAST
(Feb. 18, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/02/18/thesnitch-in-your-pocket.html (“[C]ell-phone tracking is among the more unsettling forms of
government surveillance, conjuring up Orwellian images of Big Brother secretly following
your movements through the small device in your pocket.”).
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Katz test, namely, whether “society is prepared to recognize this ex180
pectation of privacy as ‘reasonable.’”
Of course, what society expects is not always consistent with the
181
expectations of the government. Neither is the view of any particu182
In fact,
lar judge an accurate substitute for the attitude of society.
society’s expectations of privacy may be unreasonable because of a
lack of knowledge, a misunderstanding of the underlying technology,
183
Justice Harlan’s reasonable suggestion, and by exor pure naivety.
tension Justice Alito’s, fails to properly fill these holes and leaves as
many loopholes open in the Fourth Amendment as does Justice Scalia’s trespass theory.
Importantly, electronic tracking information does not flow directly to the police in every instance. Police are increasingly turning
to Internet service providers and to data storage companies that control, monitor, and enable the electronic capabilities of any particular
184
While the release of such information is certainly not as
device.
180. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
181. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 452 (1927) (“[A] balance should be
sought between that which will preserve the fundamental safeguard which the Amendment was designed to secure, and at the same time not unduly fetter the arm of the Government in the enforcement of law.”), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1967); see also United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the defendant was merely an “occasional passenger” of a vehicle upon which police
installed a GPS tracking device and thus “lacked standing to contest the installation and
use of the GPS device”).
182. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“[J]udges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”); see also Somini Sengupta, Courts Divided Over Searches of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/11/26/technology/legality-of-warrantless-cellphone-searches-goes-to-courts-andlegislatures.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the various, inconsistent ways that
judges from different circuits have addressed the same privacy concerns raised by modern
technology).
183. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (noting that while “the Katz test rests on the assumption
that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations,” it remains true that “[d]ramatic technological change may lead to periods in
which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in
popular attitudes”).
184. See Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms Are Flooded by Requests to Aid Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES
(July

8,

2012),

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-

requests-to-aid-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting that cellphone carriers
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simple as asking with a smile, the “third-party doctrine” ensures that
185
This
policing agencies will have access without much more effort.
doctrine holds that when an individual knowingly entrusts the security
of private information to a third party, that individual has relin186
quished any expectation of privacy in that information. Alternatively, the individual has assumed the risk that his information may be re187
This doctrine has been upheld not only in cases where
vealed.
criminals have described their crimes to third parties that have then
188
gone to the police, but also to situations in which banks have re189
Applied to cases of
leased the financial records of their clients.
electronic surveillance, an individual might be said to have relinquished any expectation of privacy in his internet activity and even
the content of calls, text messages, and, of course, location. As long
as an individual has knowingly revealed that information through a
responded to “1.3 million demands for subscriber information” in 2011 from “law enforcement agencies seeking text messages, caller locations and other information in the
course of investigations”).
185. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.”), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–
3421 (2006).
186. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563
(2009) (“By disclosing to a third party, the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment
rights in the information revealed. . . . In other words, a person cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third party. The Fourth Amendment
simply does not apply.”).
187. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the number dialed from his telephone because he “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed”).
188. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (“Given the possibility or
probability that one of his colleagues is cooperating with the police, it is only speculation
to assert that the defendant’s utterances would be substantially different or his sense of
security any less if he also thought it possible that the suspected colleague is wired for
sound.”).
189. See Miller, 425 U.S. at, 443 (holding that the defendant did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of checks and deposit slips filed to two banks because they were not confidential communications but negotiable instruments voluntarily
conveyed to banks in the ordinary course of business).
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run-of-the-mill service contract, for example, the “third-party doctrine” ensures that even a single subsequent request will allow police
190
access.
The resulting hiccup is one unique to our modern context: Access to the modern information market necessarily requires one to
accept the very practical possibility that third-parties will have access
to this transmitted data. As Justice Sotomayor suggested, future technology may very well force the Court to reconsider the very nature of
191
As Paul
privacy and its relationship to the Fourth Amendment.
192
To be socially active
Ohm points out, however, that time is now.
members of society, modern consumers are left with few alternatives
but to make public extensive records regarding their whereabouts, interests, and possessions, lest they choose to opt out from integration
193
altogether. Upholding the third-party doctrine as it currently exists
would ignore the needs of the deeply connected state in which we

190. For an opposing perspective, see Kerr, supra note 186, at 565 (arguing that understanding the third-party doctrine as a “subset of consent law rather than an application of
the reasonable expectation of privacy test” allows it to “fit[] naturally within the rest of
Fourth Amendment law”).
191. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.” (citations omitted)).
192. See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1310 (“If we woke up tomorrow in a world without privacy, we might also find ourselves in a world without constitutional protection from new,
invasive police powers. This bleak scenario is not science fiction, for tomorrow we will likely wake up in that world.”).
193. See Hutchins, supra note 179, at 411 (“Though the necessities of modern life may
at times require the disclosure of discrete portions of our daily routine to the handful of
private parties that provide us with services, it is unlikely most Americans would sanction
pervasive monitoring by our government.”); see also Ohm, supra note 69, at 1314–16 (describing how the concurrence of the “one device,” a high-powered machine like an iPhone
that continually sends a person’s information to an online provider; the “cloud,” distant
servers that store millions of private messages and work product; “the social,” social networks that encourage people to reveal their thoughts and behaviors; and “Big Data,” companies that analyze all this information to infer private details about a person’s life have
created a new “surveillance society” in which privacy has effectively disintegrated).
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194

now reside.
In a “world without privacy,” the Fourth Amendment
must adopt a similarly fresh perspective or else it will leave vulnerable
195
those it seeks to protect.
b. The Array of Information Gathered by Third-Party Technology
196
Rewards in Medias Res Investigation and Enables Armchair
Policing
Given the vulnerabilities already afforded by the current state of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is particularly disconcerting that
it also rewards police who take advantage of its loopholes. In many
cases, information gathered through electronic sources already exists
in one form or another and often in the hands of more than one enti197
Thus even when a law enforcement agency must first obtain a
ty.
warrant or request certain information from an internet service provider, subsequent access to the wealth of available information regard198
This not only allows
ing any particular target is nearly immediate.
law enforcement agents to reap the fruits of third-party efforts, but also rewards their behavior in the expenses, resources, and time saved
199
by doing so.
The extent of information that can be gleaned from this process
supports a new approach to policing that this Comment will refer to
as “armchair policing.” This concept is best described in the context
of the “mosaic theory,” the approach emphasized by the lower court

194. See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1331 (arguing that “getting rid of the third-party doctrine is necessary but not nearly sufficient to ensure the appropriate protection of the
Fourth Amendment”).
195. Id. at 1311 (“If we continue to interpret the Fourth Amendment as we always have,
we will find ourselves not only in a surveillance society, but also in a surveillance state.”).
196. See in medias res, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/in%20medias%20res (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (defining the phrase “in media res” as
“in or into the middle of a narrative or plot”).
197. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
198. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009) (“One need only consider what the police may learn, practically effortlessly, from planting a single [GPS] device. The whole of a person’s progress through the world, into both public and private
spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy periods possibly limited only by
the need to change the transmitting unit’s batteries.”).
199. See Lichtblau, supra note 184 (describing reports that “law enforcement officials
are shifting away from wiretaps in favor of other forms of cell tracking that are generally
less legally burdensome, less time consuming and less costly”).
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200

in Maynard.
The “mosaic theory” emphasized that “[p]rolonged
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not,
and what he does ensemble.” Moreover, “[t]hese types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual
201
Most importantly, however, “‘[w]hat may
trip viewed in isolation.”
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one
202
Alternatively put, the “prowho has a broad view of the scene.’”
longed surveillance of a person’s movements may reveal an intimate
picture of his life . . . occasion[s] a heretofore unknown type of intru203
sion into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.”
As the “third-party doctrine” grants police the ability to begin an
investigation in medias res, law enforcement officers are thus afforded
the capacity to sit back, relax, and sift through large quantities of information from the comfort and the safety of their own offices, simultaneously avoiding many substantive legal barriers. In terms of the
expenses saved by substituting actual fieldwork for a leisurely datamining process alone, it is no stretch to suggest that “armchair policing” is a highly attractive option and a more effective one as well.
This new ability greatly upsets the balance of effort and reward.
Traditionally, the expense of gathering information against a particular target was an important factor in whether a law enforcement
204
agency might proceed against a particular target. The nature of an
ongoing investigation also provides some degree of extended supervision supplied either internally or by a judge, another protection re205
By removing the balancing of
scinded in this abbreviated process.

200. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011).
201. Id. at 562.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 562–65. The court also noted that “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, means do matter.” Id. at 566.
204. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (“Traditional surveillance for any extended period of
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance at issue in
this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks—would have
required a large team . . . . Only an investigation of unusual importance could have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources. Devices like the one used in the
present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”).
205. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (declaring that the primary reason behind the warrant procedure is to “interpose a neutral and detached magistrate be-
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risk and reward introduced by the warrant process, “armchair policing” thus inappropriately inflates the information-gathering ability of
law enforcement relative to the vulnerable individual.
2. The Legitimate Interest in Effective Policing Mechanisms Benefits
from Unclear Boundaries and Suffers from Arbitrary Judicial
Whims
Interest in individual privacy aside, it would be a substantive
omission not to acknowledge a factor just as weighty: the interest in
206
an effective and unburdened police force. While it has been posited previously that the inherent nature of the Fourth Amendment introduces inefficiency into the policing system, it has also been emphasized that extending its protection too far will unnecessarily impede
207
This fundamental struggle between enabling popolicing efforts.
lice with the best possible tools to facilitate law enforcement versus
the concern for individual privacy is a significant factor in driving the
208
judiciary’s inconsistent applications of the Fourth Amendment.
The interest in making accessible to officers and to federal agents
the most effective, useful, and up-to-date technology is a cornerstone
of an effective law enforcement system. Better tools not only facilitate
discovery and prosecution of crime but also help law enforcement stay
competitive relative to criminals all too willing to exploit the best
technology available. Thus, to unnecessarily restrict police access to
outdated means and mechanisms already abandoned by their opposi209
tion places them at a severe disadvantage. Professor Orin Kerr described this balancing act by the courts as an “equilibrium-based” approach in which the Fourth Amendment is inconsistently interpreted
tween the citizen and the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
206. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
207. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Of course the
[Fourth] [A]mendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth. There is a tradeoff between security and privacy, and often it favors security.” (citations omitted)).
208. See supra Part I.B.
209. See Ulf Wolf, Cyber-Crime: Law Enforcement Must Keep Pace with Tech-Savvy Criminals,
DIGITALCOMMUNITIES

(Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Cyber

-Crime-Law-Enforcement-Must-Keep-Pace.html (“The important point is that cybercriminals aren’t sitting still; they’re probably increasing the distance between themselves
and the law—beyond the yonder mountain range already. Law enforcement has no option but to catch up.”).
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to maintain a somewhat equal playing field between law enforcement
210
and would-be criminals. Yet this theory suffers from an underlying
problem: Law enforcement officers often discover the limits to their
power only after violating those boundaries. The equilibrium-based
approach is a rigged game: One side has no clue what the rules are
while the other has no rules at all.
Compare the way in which state and federal courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment differently despite factually similar
211
circumstances. In Garcia, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit held
that no warrant was required before police attached a GPS-enabled
tracking device to someone’s vehicle because “GPS tracking is on the
same side of the divide with the surveillance cameras and satellite im212
Likewise in Marquez, attaching a GPS-enabled tracking deaging.”
vice to someone’s bumper violates no “legitimate expectation of pri213
Yet the Washington Supreme Court said any installation of
vacy.”
GPS devices onto a person’s vehicle necessitated a warrant because of
214
the dangers of prolonged electronic surveillance, and the Supreme
Court of New York did the same while also emphasizing that GPS
technology is “vastly different and exponentially more sophisticated”
215
In all
than a “mere enhancement of human sensory capability.”
210. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476 (2011). Paul Ohm took Professor Kerr’s analysis one step further and suggested
that statistical metrics be used to assess the proper balance between police powers and individual privacy. See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1313 (“The problems with Kerr’s theory are its
informality and indeterminacy. . . . To lend rigor to this approach, I recommend that
judges look for hard, objective measures of how much the playing field has tilted-statistical
quantities like length of investigation and number of indictments. When criminals use
new private services and technologies in ways that, for example, increase the average
length of police investigations, judges should relax Fourth Amendment burdens on the
police. Conversely, when the police use tools to decrease the average length of investigations, judges should tighten these burdens.”).
211. See supra Part I.B.2.
212. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
213. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 2010).
214. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
215. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009); see also United States v.
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558–67 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part, United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945 (2011) (finding that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality
of his movements over the course of a month even though law enforcement could constitutionally conduct warrantless observations of his individual movements from one place to
another while in public).
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four occasions, police acted in public places with similar intents and
results, but the opinions split down two opposite paths.
This inconsistent and, at times, discretionary application of the
Fourth Amendment creates a significant and unintended effect: the
lack of a bright-line rule delineating what police may or may not do
fundamentally frustrates their efforts. Specifically, if law enforcement
agencies have no clear guidelines, it should come as no surprise when
they overstep the bounds of their authority. Consequently, police
216
may be baffled at the very outset of their investigations. Even awaiting a final dictation by the Court leaves citizens and police engaged
inside a temporary minefield with no clear exits. Therefore, the current state of the Fourth Amendment frustrates the efforts of law enforcement just as much as it leaves the individual vulnerable to the
vast, accessible nature of modern technology.
B. Legislatures Are Better Qualified to Weigh the Concerns of All Parties
Impacted by the Uncertain Scheme of Privacy Rights
The solution to this pitched disparity between the privacy rights
afforded to the individual versus the capacity of the police to conduct
thorough investigations has so far been relegated to the judiciary.
The inconsistent application of the Fourth Amendment to an admittedly complicated series of situations, however, has left citizens and
217
Rather than a
law enforcement agencies confused and frustrated.
lack of effort or consideration, the judiciary may simply lack the insti218
tutional competence to weigh the issue properly.
Whereas the judiciary offers a limited arena in which only a few
voices can be entertained at a time, and even then only within a specific context, the legislative process offers a far larger and more accessible stage upon which to reconcile the interests of multiple parties.
Not only would the voices of the government be articulated in an
open setting, but private advocates would also be afforded a more impactful opportunity to contribute to the conversation. Additionally,
216. See Cameron Steele, New Digital Equipment Can Help Police, but Agencies Need to be
Wary, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/12
/13/3722752/as-police-expand-surveillance.html (highlighting city officials’ concerns that
“police have to be meticulous and transparent in developing guidelines for using these
surveillance systems if they want residents to see them as protectors, rather than invaders
of privacy”).
217. See supra Part II.A.1.
218. See Slobogin, supra note 176 at 19 (“Comparing the effectiveness, not to mention
the expense, of these competing approaches is far from the typical judicial job.”).

2013]

THE EVOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT

1031

the participation of officials that represent the will of certain constituencies offers the average citizen an avenue to affect legislative pro219
ceedings.
Even more significantly, a discussion at this larger stage grants
one more benefit not available to the judiciary: the chance for the
technology industry as a whole to offer its input on the nature, design,
and future evolution of electronic monitoring technology. Major
technology companies and Internet service providers, such as Google
and Verizon, have often found themselves in the middle between us220
While
ers and government agencies seeking to access their data.
many have resisted revealing their customer information, the judiciary
has been exposed to their concerns one expert witness at a time. In
contrast, a legislative setting would furnish these gatekeepers of electronic privacy with the opportunity to affect directly the laws govern221
ing their industry.
The submission of this issue to a collaborative, legislative body
would not be a case of first impression. In Title III of the Wiretap
219. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (arguing that “the legislative
branch rather than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology is changing” because “[t]echnological change may reveal the institutional limits of
the modern enterprise of constitutional criminal procedure, exposing the need for statutory guidance”). Kerr also suggests that the “deferential stance” of the Court is a message
that “we should not expect the Fourth Amendment alone to provide adequate protections
against invasions of privacy made possible by law enforcement use of new technologies.”
Id. at 838. Rather, “Congress will likely remain the primary source of privacy protections
in new technologies thanks to institutional advantages of legislatures.” Id.
220. See David Teather, Google Defies White House over Disclosing Users’ Searches, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2006/jan/21/security.usnews
(reporting that Google defied a request by the U.S. government to turn over roughly one
million randomly selected web addresses to scour the users’ search data); Ellen
Nakashima, Verizon Says It Turned over Data Without Court Orders, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2007,
at A1 (relaying Verizon Communications’ admission that it provided customers’ telephone
records to federal authorities in emergency cases without court orders several hundred
times since 2006).
221. See Nick Feamster, The Internet’s Gatekeepers, ALLTHINGSD (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://allthingsd.com/20110211/the-internets-gatekeepers/ (comparing the censorship
prominent in countries like Egypt and China to the United States to weigh two competing
concerns: “Should free and open communication . . . be considered an unalienable right?
How much control should a government or Internet service provider wield over its citizens’ communications?”).
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222

Act, Congress sought to regulate the collection of the content of
223
With an exception for wire
wire and electronic communications.
and electronic communication services providing the wiretap, the Act
effectively barred the government from intercepting all communica224
Similarly, in the
tions except those that are publicly accessible.
225
ECPA the legislature sought to extend restrictions placed on the
government’s ability to intercept traditional telephone calls onto attempts made to monitor electronic transmissions of data by comput226
er. The legislature later extended the ECPA’s scope to prohibit unfettered access to stored electronic data through the Stored
227
Communications Act.
In both instances, Congress recognized the difficulties faced by
the judiciary in enacting two broad, uniform solutions to concerns
228
shared on a large scale. The broad definitions of wiretaps and electronic communications demonstrate that Congress was well aware of
the substantial risk that inaction would facilitate the use of private
229
communications in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It also reflects a fluency with the underlying technology that individual judges
limited by time and scope are unlikely to share. A similar undertaking to resolve the quagmire currently frustrating the Fourth Amendment’s application to modern technological capabilities would likely
benefit far more from the experience of a proven collaborator than
230
the opinion of any individual judge.

222. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006)).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006).
224. Id. The definition of an “electronic communication” specifically excluded “any
communication from a tracking device.” Id.
225. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2006)).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). The ECPA also excluded from its protection communications gathered via tracking devices. Id.
227. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006).
228. See Kerr, supra note 219, at 849–50 (tracing the history leading up the enactment
of Title III, specifically, that Congress was already prepared to enact new wiretap laws to
resolve a deep split in the courts and refrained from doing so because the Court was to
hear arguments in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
954 (1967), which it “decided both . . . very much with Congress in mind”).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006).
230. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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Just as the judiciary is constantly burdened with a limited
timeframe to deal with a seemingly endless stream of cases, so too are
legislatures inundated by their own weighty dockets. The recent gridlock in Congress demonstrates that even if the legislative level is infinitely better equipped to assess the Fourth Amendment as it applies
to emerging technology, the judiciary does not have the luxury of
waiting for an external solution.
C. In the Absence of Reasoned Legislative Action, Courts Must Recognize
GPS-Enabled Tracking Falls Within the Fourth Amendment’s
Protection Against Unreasonable Government Interference
Absent legislative action, the judiciary must undertake a substantial shift in its perspective to appropriately address the privacy concerns that Jones raises. The first step is to recognize uniformly the use
of GPS-enabled tracking devices and other electronic monitoring
gadgets as searches under the Fourth Amendment in their initial installation and subsequent use by police agencies. Any warrantless use
of these devices must be considered in violation of that constitutional
231
protection. Secondly, judges would be better served by framing this
protection as a “right to exclude” the government rather than a “rea232
sonable expectation of privacy.”
1. Courts Ought to Recognize the Weaknesses of the Fourth
Amendment by Requiring Warrants Before Conducting Electronic
Surveillance
First, it is immediately necessary to classify the use of GPSenabled devices and other electronic monitoring methods as searches
under the Fourth Amendment. Whether this view is justified on the
grounds that in such circumstances the government is seeking infor233
mation or simply that people have a right “to be secure in their per234
sons, houses, papers, and effects,” a person ought to be afforded
some degree of privacy in how he chooses to use a smartphone, computer, or vehicle. Without a proper judicially authorized warrant, attaching a device to any of these items to monitor the activities of their

231. See infra Part II.C.1.
232. See infra Part II.C.2.
233. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2011) (majority opinion) (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”).
234. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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owner ought to be understood as intruding on a right to use them
without undue interference. Similarly, the use of such devices to
monitor, track, and transfer private information to police agencies,
with or without a physical installation, must also be construed as an
inappropriate exercise of power.
Warrants necessarily inject the judiciary into the investigative
235
The requirement is designed, not as a burden or speedprocess.
bump to police efforts, but rather to introduce the judgment of a
“neutral, detached magistrate” into what is typically a subjective pro236
cess initiated by officers invested in a particular outcome. Generally, this helps to legitimize and to direct the scope of most investigations. Yet, in regards to satisfying the protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment, it is also to the overall benefit of society that the
decision of a reasoned individual removed from the immediate conflict is placed between powerful electronic devices and the law en237
Requiring
forcement agents seeking to obtain that information.
warrants in the investigative process thus injects a necessary dose of
honesty—not just to prevent potential police abuse, but to add an extra layer of protection and oversight in favor of the individual.
For example, in Garcia, Judge Posner seemed convinced that GPS
technology was so similar to surveillance cameras and satellite imaging such that if the latter two did not raise Fourth Amendment con238
The Marquez court emphasized
cerns, neither should the former.
that public streets were not suitable for any reasonable expectation of
239
Regardless of whether citizens have a legitimate expectaprivacy.
tion of privacy in their travels in public, warrants provide the necessary level of legitimacy to justify police access to these exact applications of modern technology. Seizing tapes of surveillance cameras
routinely requires a warrant, and while the use of public roads is certainly within the public eye, the Supreme Court has agreed that pro235. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (“Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a ‘neutral and detached magistrate.’”).
236. Id. (holding that “where practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment
of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen’s
private premises or conversation”); see also supra text accompanying note 86.
237. Id. at 317 (“This judicial role accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that
individual freedoms will be best preserved through a separation of powers and division of
functions among the different branches and levels of Government.”).
238. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
239. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 2010).
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longed surveillance implicates Fourth Amendment protection.
Notwithstanding the lack of a bright-line rule or reasonable expecta241
tion of privacy, police can avoid these issues by obtaining the seal of
approval a warrant provides. Accordingly, warrantless police surveillance such as that in Jones must be treated as a violation of the Constitution.
2. Framing Fourth Amendment Protection as an Active Right to
Exclude Versus a Passive Right to Privacy Offers a Stronger, More
Uniform Source of Law
Even in cases where a warrant is obtained prior to the use of electronic surveillance, courts still entertain challenges to the use of evidence gathered using modern devices. Although warrants, by definition, introduce more checks into the legal process, the existing
doctrine is unclear about when a warrant is needed and under what
terms. To address this uncertainty and to better frame the tension
created in the Fourth Amendment by new technologies, the judiciary
should respond to Jones by re-framing the Fourth Amendment’s “right
242
to be secure” into a “right to exclude” the government.
Since Katz, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as protecting a right of privacy, specifically, the “reasonable expectation of
243
privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Considering privacy as the underlying motivation of the Fourth
Amendment, however, narrows the larger issue of individual privacy
into a struggle between the individual and the government. This ap244
proach has since fallen short of providing reliable protection. Furthermore, stretching Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into an era
exposed to rapid developments in information-sharing technology is a
245
lost cause.
That said, Justice Scalia’s approach in Jones is valid because physical trespass was traditionally a staple of many government investiga240. See supra text accompanying notes 132–135.
241. See supra Part II.A.2.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 356 (2009) (“This ability to
exclude is so essential to the exercise of the right to be secure that it is proper to say that it
is equivalent to the right--the right to be secure is the right to exclude.”).
243. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) superseded
by statute, Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2006).
244. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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246

tions.
Justice Scalia also agreed with Justices Sotomayor and Alito
247
What
insofar as he upheld the Katz test absent physical trespass.
their opinions collectively demonstrate, however, is that stretching the
Fourth Amendment doctrine, rooted in an age without the Internet
or the smartphone, to one in which information is constantly passed
through a vast, intangible stream of data is a stopgap measure at best,
248
Moreover, the current interpretation
and a wasted effort at worst.
of the Fourth Amendment is a primarily reactive one, offering protection only after it already has been violated. Given a system where police regularly can reap the benefits of third parties already inundated
with a person’s private information merely by requesting pre249
assembled records, a reactive right fails to afford any real protection
in a world where sensitive information is already available. The focus,
instead, must be on preventing any access.
As the Katz court famously held, “the Fourth Amendment pro250
Simultaneously, the Fourth Amendment
tects people, not places.”
251
Nowhere
text secures “their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”
in the amendment is a “reasonable expectation of privacy” mentioned, and only where there is a “warrant issued upon probable
252
cause” may this protection be violated. That the warrant process is
described as an initial protection implies that the Fourth Amendment
guarantee is not a reactive right, but a positive one to be held at the
forefront of any intrusion contemplated by the government. An indi253
vidual’s right to “secure” his items is an additional sign that courts
ought to employ a process in which the Fourth Amendment acts as
the first line of defense to unreasonable searches before they may be
carried out. Viewing this protection as a “right to exclude” properly
encapsulates a positive guarantee flexible enough to adapt to a society
254
increasingly exposed by pervasive information-sharing technology.
246. See supra Part I.A.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 133–135.
248. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
250. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) superseded
by statute, Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2006).
251. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Clancy, supra note 242, at 357 (“The essential attribute of the right to be secure
is the ability of the individual to exclude the government from intruding. . . . Without the
ability to exclude, a person has no security.”).
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Alternatively, the right to secure one’s effects against unreasonable intrusion can be analogized to a right to exclude the government
255
In the course
from unreasonably intruding on those same objects.
of consistently respecting the right of an individual to be secure in
one’s home, for example, courts have guaranteed the freedom to do
256
As with a right to security, this
what one wishes inside that home.
freedom cannot be fully respected without simultaneously affording
257
the ability to control access and, at times, to deny it. This scope of
protection ought to be no different simply because a person’s papers
and effects exist within an electronic network rather than a physical
folder cabinet.
While this approach is by no means a complete solution, it offers
a more consistent and more flexible guideline for individual courts to
make informed decisions in limited timeframes. Given the annual
software and hardware updates available for most smartphones on the
market, there is little doubt that new methods of gathering and storing information will eventually replace GPS-enabled devices and further blur the line at issue in Jones. A “right to exclude” is designed to
258
avoid becoming as outdated as a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
because it is not as subjective nor is it tethered to any physical limits.
Thus, while imperfect, the “right to exclude” presents a doctrine
more stable and more flexible than the outdated reasoning applied in
Jones.
III. CONCLUSION
United States v. Jones reaches far beyond the sum of its parts and
implicates a much larger concern—the degree of individual privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment. While no Justice disputed the
outcome of Jones, Justices Sotomayor and Alito disapproved of Justice

255. See id. at 358 (“The core concept, the right to exclude, remains—the ability of the
individual to refuse to accede to the government intrusion.”).
256. See id. at 345 (noting how a person’s home has been described by courts as a sanctuary in need of special protection).
257. See STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 266 (1988) (“[T]o control access by
others to a private object (to a private place, to information, or to an activity). [It] is the
ability to maintain the state of being private or to relax it as, and to the degree that, and to
whom one chooses.”).
258. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) superseded
by statute, Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2006).
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Scalia’s emphasis on property rights for good reason: substantial
quantities of information no longer exist as physical documents, but
260
Moreover, the increasing
rather as intangible electronic data.
ubiquity of smart devices designed to share information efficiently has
expanded exponentially the vast cloud of potentially private information available to “armchair police” courtesy of the “third-party doc261
Jones avoided confronting either of these issues despite
trine.”
262
vague warnings of a new technological age, electing instead to con263
done the inconsistencies of the lower courts and to further weaken
264
a Fourth Amendment already at risk of irrelevancy. Although legis265
latures may ultimately be better suited to reconcile these concerns,
courts must step forward as the first line of defense to a constitutional
guarantee by accepting two core principles: (1) utilizing GPS-enabled
266
devices without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, and (2) a
positive “right to exclude” presents a more flexible and more con267
sistent source of protection than a reactive expectation of privacy.

259. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
262. See supra text accompanying note 134.
263. See supra Part I.B.
264. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part II.B.
266. See supra Part II.C.1.
267. See supra Part II.C.2.

